Stage Two Tax Reform and Housing by Fallis, George
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 26, Number 3 (Fall 1988) Article 6
Stage Two Tax Reform and Housing
George Fallis
York University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Fallis, George. "Stage Two Tax Reform and Housing." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 26.3 (1988) : 603-628.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol26/iss3/6
STAGE TWO TAX REFORM AND
HOUSING*
BY GEORGE FALLis**
I. INTRODUCTION ............................ 604
I. THE CANADIAN PROPOSALS ................. 606
III. THE EFFECTS OF STAGE TWO ON HOUSING
A. Dynamic Models ....................
B. General Equilibium Models ............
C. Partial Equilibrium Models .............
1. Uncontrolled rental markets .......
2. Rent controlled markets .........
3. Ownership markets .............
615
615
617
619
622
623
IV. CONCLUDING EVALUATION ....
Copyright, 1988, George Fallis.
Much of the analysis of this paper builds upon previous joint work with Larry Smith to
be published as Fallis and Smith (forthcoming). I am indebted to him for many ideas, but
he is not responsible for any errors in this paper. I am indebted to the comments and
questions from several conference participants. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
has commissioned several papers on the MSST and housing but they would not release the
work in progress at the time this paper was written.
**Department of Economics, York University.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
I. INTRODUCTION
The value-added tax proposed by the Minister of Finance of
the Government of Canada,1 like most value-added taxes (VAT) in
Europe, is intended as a tax on final consumption by households.
A retail sales tax is usually also intended as a tax on final consump-
tion; but whereas a retail sales tax taxes consumption value at the
final stage in the production-distribution-retailing chain, the
proposed multi-stage tax levies tax on the incremental value added
at each stage in the production-distribution-retailing chain.
A large percentage of household consumption is housing
services: in Canada housing consumption was 18 percent of total
consumption in 1984.2 Canada seeks to have a comprehensive base
for the value-added tax and therefore would like to include housing
consumption. However, there is a problem.
All households consume housing services; both households
who rent housing and households who own housing. It is obvious
that landlords are the firms supplying housing services to tenants.
But who produces the housing services consumed by homeowners?
The homeowning household is the firm supplying housing services to
itself. The household can be thought of as both tenant and
landlord. In principle, the homeowner should be treated as a firm
producing housing services; just as a landlord should be treated as
a firm producing housing services. If the tax on consumption were
levied as a single-stage retail tax, it would be imposed on the value
of housing services produced by homeowners and by landlords. If
the tax were levied as a multi-stage tax, it would include the value
added by homeowners as producers of housing services and the
value added by landlords as producers of housing services. Both are
the last stage in the chain of producing housing services. However,
1 Canada, The White Paper Tax Reform 1987 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1984) at
59.
2Statistics Canada, National Income and Ependiture Accounts 1970-1984, Catalogue 13-
201 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1984).
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there are severe political and administrative difficulties to levying a
tax on homeowners-as-landlords.
The administrative difficulties are significant, but probably
not insurmountable. The main problem is that there is not an
explicit market transaction between the household-as-tenant and the
household-as-landlord, and hence no market valuation of the housing
services produced. In place of a market valuation, there would have
to be rules and regulations developed to impute the value of
housing services produced. (Statistics Canada when calculating
consumption in the nation imputes the aggregate value of housing
services produced by homeowners.) This administrative problem is
similar to that which arises in designing an income tax. Taxpayers
who own and occupy their homes are landlords to themselves and
earn income as landlords. This income should be included in the
total income of the taxpayer. This income is the imputed net rent
and would be calculated as the imputed gross rent of the owner's
house minus any expenses incurred in producing the housing
services. Both levying a VAT on housing consumption and including
net imputed rent in taxable income require an imputation of the
gross value of housing services. Some European nations do include
net imputed rent in the income tax base, but Canada does not.
Therefore, while it is obviously feasible to include homeowners'
housing consumption in a VAT, it would be very difficult in Canada.
It would probably require a parallel change in the personal income
tax system; but the recent reforms to the personal income tax in
Canada did not include net imputed rent in the tax base. Canadians
have no experience with the concept of the homeowner-as-firm and
would likely find it distasteful and difficult to grasp. Previous propo-
sals to include net imputed rent in the income tax base have
certainly been greeted this way. Also, the compliance costs of
including the homeowner's value added in a VAT would be
significant because most households do not keep the sorts of
accounting records suitable for establishing an auditable tax base.
Finally, inclusion of homeownership would add millions of collection
points to the tax system.
The administrative barriers are further reinforced by the
political barriers. Housing consumption is a necessity, and there will
always be pressures, well-intentioned though perhaps misguided, to
exempt housing from a sales tax. Also, homeownership has a special
1988]
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quality bound up with myths about "a man's home is his castle" or
"homeownership leads to responsibility and a stake in the
community" or "every hardworking family aspires to own their own
home". Homeownership seems out of reach to many families in
large Canadian cities at present. These factors create strong
political resistance to new taxes on housing.
Together the political and administrative problems mean it
is probably impossible to include homeowners' value added in the
tax base. The essence of the difficulty is an example - probably the
most important example - of a more general problem when levying
a value-added tax on final consumption, namely how to deal with
home production. Many consumption items are produced in the
home; and also in many cases the household can choose between
producing the items themselves or buying them from firms in the
private market. Households can make their own meals at home, or
eat in a restaurant. A spouse can take care of children at home, or
the children can go to daycare. And a household can buy a house
and produce housing services for themselves (cutting the grass,
shovelling the snow, arranging maintenance and insurance, paying
the utilities, mortgage and property taxes and so on); or it can rent
a house and in effect buy the housing services produced by the
landlord. In general it will be extremely difficult to include the
value added from home production in a consumption tax base (just
as it has been difficult to include the value of this production in the
measurement of national income).
Canada proposes to levy tax only on sales of a commercial
nature and so exempt home production and the production of non-
profit groups, charities and government. These exemptions
significantly reduce the share of total consumption which is subject
to full tax.
II. THE CANADIAN PROPOSALS
In June 1987, the Canadian Minister of Finance released The
White Paper: Tax Reform 1987 which proposed a significant
overhaul of the federal tax system in two stages. The first stage
involved changes to the personal income and corporate income tax
system and the extension of the federal manufacturers' sales tax to
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telecommunications services. The thrust of Stage One was to
reduce personal and corporate income tax rates by broadening the
personal and corporate income tax bases and raising the rate on
realised capital gains. The base broadening was to be achieved by
eliminating special tax advantages. Roughly speaking, there was no
tax increase in these proposals; the change was revenue neutral.
Stage One had significant implications for housing; the effect
depending on the gains from income rate reduction relative to the
losses from losing tax privileges and the increased tax rate on capital
gains.3
It is worth reiterating that the special tax privileges for home
ownership - the exemption for imputed net rent and the exemption
for capital gains realised on sale of a principal residence - were
retained. The political and administrative barriers could not be
overcome.
In the second stage of tax reform, the federal government
proposes to introduce a new multi-stage sales tax system. Because
a new sales tax system is a national undertaking involving
fundamental change and because the federal government wishes to
explore the possibility for an integrated federal-provincial sales tax,
Stage Two will "require wide consultations with interested Canadians
and extensive federal provincial discussions".4 "The government
proposes to replace the existing federal manufacturers' sales tax with
a broad-based multi-stage tax that extends to the retail level. This
multi-stage tax would be a form of value-added tax. It would be
levied on and collected from all businesses, in stages, as goods move
from primary producers and processors to wholesalers, retailers, and
finally to consumers."5
The existing MST is applied to a manufacturer's sale price of
goods produced in Canada and to the customs value of imported
goods. The rate of tax for most manufactured products is 12
3 See George Fallis & Lawrence B. Smith, 'Tax Reform and Residential Real Estate" in
Jack Mintz and John Whalley eds, The Economic Impacts of Tax Reform (Toronto: Canadian
Tax Foundation) (forthcoming) for an analysis.
4 Canada, Tax Reform 1987 Sales Tax Reform (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1987) at
2.
5Supra, note 1.
1988]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
percent, with construction materials taxed at 8 percent and alcohol
and tobacco at 15 percent. Many items such as food, clothing,
footwear and books are exempt.
It is likely, although the documentation and political
pressures make this somewhat uncertain, that Stage Two will also be
revenue neutral. The removal of the MST and its replacement by
a multi-stage tax (MSST) would generate sufficient increased
revenues to finance an enriched refundable tax credit for low-income
households, removal of personal and corporate income tax
surcharges, and further personal income tax reductions for middle-
income families. The rate of tax for the MSST is yet to be deter-
mined. It will depend upon the net revenue requirements noted
above and the comprehensiveness of the tax base. The Department
of Finance documents and this paper assume a rate of 8 percent.
The federal government outlined three options for
implementing the MSST. The first is a national sales tax integrating
the federal and provincial sales taxes; much as existing federal and
provincial income taxes are now integrated. Both the federal MST
and the existing provincial retail sales taxes would be removed. A
national sales tax would have the same base in all provinces but
permit the provinces to set separate rates. To accommodate
variable rates, the tax would be calculated on each sales invoice.
The second and third options involve only the federal government
- the MST would be replaced by a federal-only MSST. The second
option is a federal goods and services tax applied at a uniform rate
to virtually all goods and services. It would not require a separate
tax calculation on each invoice; rather a business would calculate its
tax liability as total taxable sales multiplied times the tax rate, minus
total taxable purchases multiplied times the tax rate. The third
option is a federal value-added tax which would allow different rates
to be applied to selected goods and services or certain classes of
business operation. The tax would have to be calculated on each
sales invoice. This option would be similar to the VAT in many
European countries. Most provinces have expressed interest in the
national sales tax and negotiations are ongoing, but the federal-only
options have not been ruled out.
The MSST rate also will depend significantly on whether the
federal-only option is selected or if existing provincial sales taxes are
removed and a joint federal-provincial MSST is put in place. The
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federal-provincial option will have much higher rates. Which option
is chosen will not matter significantly for goods already subject to
provincial sales tax and which have a full MST component in their
price. However for goods not subject to tax under the MST and
the provincial sales tax but taxable under the MSST, the choice of
the federal-provincial option will have huge implications. The rate
of tax will go from 0 to as high as 15 even 20 percent under the
federal-provincial option, (compared to the 8 percent under the
federal only options). Housing will be subject to a substantially
greater tax increase if the federal-provincial option is selected
(although the rate will not be as high as 15 percent). This paper
considers only the 8 percent federal rate.
The introduction to this paper identified the difficulties in
including housing services produced by homeowners in a
consumption tax base. In order that a VAT not distort the choice
between owning and renting housing, an exemption for owner-
produced housing services would have to be paralleled by an
exemption for landlord-produced housing services. This is the
choice of the Canadian government. Residential rentals are exempt
and owner-produced housing services are exempt.6 This exemption
will not extend to hotel and motel services or other residential
rentals on a short-term basis (periods of less than 60 days).
Producers of tax-exempt services will pay for inputs such as
heat and electricity and pay for repairs and improvements at prices
which include the MSST, but will not be permitted to recover any
of the tax paid. Producers of taxable supplies will pay tax on sales
and face input prices including the tax but will be permitted to
recover the tax paid on their inputs. Where a building has some
long-term rentals but also significant short-term rentals, the building
will be treated as having two discrete parts - an exempt apartment
and a taxable hotel. Revenues and taxes paid on inputs will be
prorated accordingly.
Consider now the capital good or housing stock (the building
and land) used in producing housing services. The sale of new
residential buildings will be taxable. Builders of houses and
6The MSST exempts all home-produced final consumption and transactions of a non-
commercial sector.
1988] 609
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
apartments (and hotels) will be taxable on their sales but eligible for
tax credits in respect of the purchase of taxed inputs such as
equipment, materials and services. (Purchasers of new houses or
apartments will pay prices including MSST but as producers of
exempt housing services will not be eligible for any input tax credit.)
Developers of land will be taxable on sales of developed land and
eligible for credits on taxed purchases. A self-supply rule will apply
so that where a developer/builder subsequently rents to tenants, the
developer will be treated as though the building were sold at fair
market value when it is put into rental use. Resales of used
residential buildings together with the associated land will be tax
exempt. Even if an owner-occupied house includes a room used as
the office of a self-employed taxpayer, the entire proceeds from sale
will be tax exempt. If, however, tax credits have been claimed on
some part of the acquisition cost or any cost of capital
improvements, then a prorated share of the resale revenues will be
subject to tax. Sales by an individual of cottages or hobby farms will
be tax exempt. Real property will be broadly defined to include
leasehold interests and sale of such interests would be taxable
according to the above rules.
Because the MSST is levied on a consumption base, each
taxable stage in the production process is allowed a credit for the
purchase of taxed capital property. Resales of capital property are
taxable where an input tax credit was previously claimed in respect
of the property. Thus in general, new and used capital property are
on the same footing. If a stage in the production process is tax
exempt, firms are not eligible for tax credits on input purchases or
capital purchases. In the housing sector, producers of new and
renovated housing stock are taxable; but of course households and
landlords are not allowed a credit on their purchase. However, sales
of used residential buildings are tax exempt and therefore new and
used residential buildings are not on the same footing.
The resale of a used residential building in the course of a
business which involves the purchase, substantial renovation and
resale of such dwellings will be subject to tax. The taxpayer will be
able to recover taxes paid on inputs and to claim a notional tax
credit on the purchase of the used dwelling even though tax was not
paid on sale. Therefore, renovators are only taxable on their value
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added; and the resale of substantially renovated homes will be on
the same footing as new homes.
These are the main provisions of the proposed MSST
relating to housing. There are other more detailed aspects, and
certain ambiguities about detailed aspects, but these cannot be
considered here. To sum up, the MSST is to be levied on
consumption and is to be applied to the value added in each stage
of the production process as goods move from primary producers
and processors to wholesalers, retailers and finally to households.
However, the final stage in the production of housing services is
difficult - administratively and politically - to include in the tax base
and so the final stage is exempted. Sales of new houses and
apartments will be taxable, but sales of used residential buildings will
be exempted.
In order to analyse the likely effects of these proposals, it is
necessary to introduce them into models of the Canadian economy
and Canadian housing markets in which producers and consumers
adjust their decisions in response to the tax and so prices and
output levels also change. This is the task of the next section.
However, as a conclusion to the section describing the proposals it
is useful to present a highly stylized picture of the MSST effects at
the moment of their imposition when nobody changes their decisions
and assuming all taxes are instantly shifted forward into increased
prices.
Thus it will be assumed that a value-added tax at each stage
in the production-distribution-retailing chain is passed forward in
increased prices so that, for example, an 8 percent tax on value
added results in an 8 percent increase in the price to the household
of the consumption good. The MST similarly would have been
forward shifted so its removal would reduce prices by the MST rate.
Existing homeowners and existing landlords will face price
increases of 8 percent on certain inputs which are subject to VAT,
for example, on electricity, heating fuel, any purchasers of services
such as services of plumbers or electricians, and on insurance and
financial services. To the extent pre-reform prices included a
component of the MST, these price increases will be less than 8
percent. They will likely also face property tax increases because
the goods and services purchased by local governments will increase
in price due to the MSST. Under these assumptions, the price of
1988]
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housing services will rise to reflect these input price increases.
Therefore, the final consumption of housing services is not
completely exempt from tax.
The housing services of existing producers are only exempt
insofar as certain stages in the production process are exempt. The
final stage in the production of the consumption good housing
services can be thought of as management-superintendent-
maintenance activity. Homeowners undertake this bundle of
activities for themselves; landlords provide it to tenants. This is the
last stage in the production chain of housing services. This bundle
of activities combines two groups of inputs to produce housing
services. The first group is the flow of services from the housing
stock. The second group includes diverse inputs - heat, light, labour
and building materials for repairs, insurance, some public services.
The input costs in this group are often summarized under the
heading of operating costs. The MSST proposals exempt the value
added in the final stage, the management-superintendent-
maintenance stage. They also exempt the value added derived from
the existing housing stock. But the value added in operating inputs
is taxed. Thus if operating costs were 20 percent of total value
added, then housing services would rise by 1.6 percent (.2x8) and
the consumption good housing could be thought of as bearing tax at
a 1.6 percent rate 7 if the services were produced using the existing
housing stock. Assuming that the price of existing housing stock
does not change, housing services produced in the future by those
who buy existing stock will also be taxed at a 1.6 percent rate.
New buildings sales, however, are subject to the MSST.
With the removal of the MST, many prices would fall, especially of
manufactured goods or goods produced using manufactured
intermediate goods. And the price of building materials would fall
by 8 percent (then rise 8 percent due to the MSST). Assuming
building materials are 40 percent of the cost of a new building, and
that some machinery prices would fall, then the price of new
buildings would rise by about 4.5 percent. Assuming that services
from housing stock are 70 percent of the value added in housing
7 The increase will be less because some prices of operating inputs indirectly reflect the
MST and will not rise 8 percent in price when the MST is replaced by the MSST.
(VOL. 26 No. 3
Stage Two Tax Reform and Housing
services, then housing services produced using stock constructed
after the MSST is introduced would rise in price by 4.75 percent (.2
x 8 + .7 x 4.5). Only the last stage in the process (10 percent of
the value added) is exempt.
The analysis of this section has not included the possibility
that the MSST on financial services might raise the mortgage rate
of interest.
Ill. THE EFFECTS OF STAGE TWO ON HOUSING
When analysing a new tax there is often a tendency to
consider the new tax alone, neglecting the fact that the new
revenues must also imply either increased public services or
increased transfer payments or a reduction in other taxes or a
reduction in the budget deficit. However, it is the combination of
changes which must be analysed. It is the combination which will
actually be implemented. (Similarly, there is often a tendency to
consider only the benefits of a new government expenditure,
neglecting the costs of increased taxes or borrowing which will
finance it.) In this paper the combination of changes to consider is
obvious because a package was announced by the Minister of
Finance. The changes analysed are: the removal of the MST, the
levy of a MSST, the enrichment of the refundable tax credit, the
removal of the personal and corporate income tax surcharges and
the personal income tax cuts for middle income families. Thus the
tax reforms to be analysed will be called Stage Two rather than the
imposition of a MSST.
Canada was the first industrial country to levy a
manufacturer's sales tax; and 60 years later is the only country still
doing so.8 The MST has been widely criticized and there exists a
strong consensus that reform is needed. The Stage Two reforms
thus begin with a presumption that removing the MST would
generate significant efficiency gains.
It will be assumed that Stage Two will not generate any new
revenue to the federal government, although many would challenge
8 Supra, note 4 at 9.
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this assumption. The federal government will face increasing
pressure to reduce its deficit; a small increase in the MSST rate can
generate millions of dollars; the temptation will be great to use
Stage Two reform, or to use the MSST slightly after reform, to
reduce the deficit.9
Broadly speaking, Stage Two reduces income taxes and
increases consumption taxes. It reduces sales taxes on manufactured
goods (now taxed at 12%) and increases sales taxes on services and
retail trade (now exempt but to be taxed at 8%). It increases taxes
on housing services, especially those produced using new housing
stock; the effect of the MSST on housing is somewhat offset by the
removal of the 8 percent MST on construction materials.
As noted in the previous section, an analysis of the effects
of Stage Two requires models of the Canadian economy in which
the rate of economic growth; the prices of goods and services; the
returns to labour, capital and land; the levels of output of all goods
and services; and levels of imports, exports and the exchange rate
can all change in response to the tax reform. A comprehensive
analysis of Stage Two on housing would involve three types of
analysis: dynamic analysis looking at the growth of the economy
over time; general equilibrium analysis looking at the interaction of
all markets in the economy; and partial equilibrium analysis looking
at the housing market alone. Ideally of course one would like to
have a dynamic general equilibrium model with sufficient
disaggregation that the effects on housing markets alone could be
studied. Unfortunately, dynamic models and general equilibrium
models seldom have housing components in which one can place
much faith.
9 See Wayne R. Thirsk, 'The Value Added Tax in Canada: Savior or Siren Song" (1987)
13 Can. Pub. Pol'y 259, for a general discussion of the MSST and a more complete
presentation of the argument that the MSST will be used to increase taxes.
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A. Dynamic Models
It is often asserted that increasing consumption taxes will
reduce current consumption, increase savings and increase the rate
of economic growth. This seems to be one of the motivations of tax
reform. The dynamic models in the theoretical economics literature,
however, give a mixed report, noting how different motives for
savings can lead to different results from increasing consumption
taxes. In any event the dynamic effects of Stage Two have not been
analysed by myself or other Canadian researchers and so the effects
of these on the housing sector will have to be ignored. It is
possible, however, that these effects are important. Housing stock
is a significant fraction of the national capital stock and changes in
the aggregate stock would no doubt be accompanied by changes in
housing stock. Also, the principal asset for most households is home
equity and thus tax changes which encourage savings would likely
increase investment in housing equity. Finally, if Stage Two (which
has a tax on financial services) were to change interest rates it
would have a significant effect on housing; although because Canada
is a small open economy our interest rates are largely determined in
world capital markets and so Stage Two is unlikely to change
interest rates. Some have argued that mortgage interest rates may
rise while other interest rates remain the same because of rigidities
in capital markets.
B. General Equilibrium Models'°
Stage Two will cause a once-and-for-all increase in the price
level and a significant change in relative prices. It can also cause
changes in the relative prices of factors of production: land, labour
and capital. These relative price effects are best analysed using a
multi-sector general equilibrium model.
10James B. Davies, "Manufacturers' Sales Tax, Value-Added tax, and Effective TAx
Incidence" in Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian
Tax Foundation, 1986) provides a good discussion of the general equilibrium approach to
analysing tax reform.
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In the simplest general equilibrium model with fixed supplies
of all factors of production and no international trade, a sales tax on
all consumption items is fully shifted forward into increased prices.11
The assumption of full forward shifting is usually the starting point
for analysis of tax reform. This approach was used at the end of
the last section when the MSST on housing was assumed to be fully
shifted forward. Unfortunately all too often this is also the finishing
point in the analysis of tax reform. However in the Canadian
economy all factors of production are not fixed, the MSST is not a
comprehensive tax on all consumption and we are a small open
economy. The simple general equilibrium model is not appropriate
and we should not assume the MSST will be fully shifted forward in
increased prices or that all prices will shift by the same percentage.
But unfortunately available complex general equilibrium
models do not give a detailed picture of the housing sector.
Nevertheless, general equilibrium analysis does offer several lessons
which are important when thinking about Stage Two and housing.
First, the interaction among sectors, and general efficiency
gains following tax changes can be significant. For example,
increasing the sales tax on services is often thought to reduce the
total output in the service sector. Hamilton and Whalley 12analysed
a MST/MSST substitution and found service sector output to
increase slightly, despite increased tax, because other sectors whose
taxes were reduced increased their demand for services. Stage Two
increases taxes on housing slightly but Hamilton and Whalley found
residential construction to increase slightly because efficiency gains
throughout the economy increased the demand.
A second lesson from general equilibrium models is that sales
tax increases on housing (however financed) can lead to changes not
only in final housing prices but also in the prices of factors of
production. Ballentine and Thirsk1 3 developed a general equilibrium
11Alternatively it can be thought of as fully shifted back into reduced factor payments.
12 (forthcoming)
1 3 J. Gregory Ballentine-and Wayne R. Thirsk, The Fiscal Incidence of Some Erperiments
in Fiscal Federalis.n Technical Report (Ottawa: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation,
1978).
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model with a well-articulated housing sector. Their model has not
been used to simulate Stage Two but their previous research
considered a tax change which is relevant. They simulated "the
replacement of a portion of the residential property tax with
revenues from the federal personal income tax". Stage Two can be
viewed roughly as an increase in tax on the ownership of residential
capital. The residential property tax can also be viewed as a tax on
housing capital. Thus the Stage Two changes as they directly affect
housing are rather similar to an increase in the national rate of
residential property tax accompanied by a decrease in income taxes
(the reverse of the Ballentine and Thirsk experiment). The
Ballentine and Thirsk model suggests that Stage Two initially will
increase the price of housing capital, which increases the cost of
housing services and causes a decrease in the quantity demanded.
Producers of housing services will try to substitute away from the
relatively more expensive capital further reducing the equilibrium
stock. The contraction of the relatively capital intensive housing
sector will cause a small downward pressure on the return to capital
(theirs was not a small open economy model). "The most striking
effect of the tax substitution" would be the induced decrease in the
price of land in housing. (In their experiment a 7.5 percent
reduction in the residential property tax increased land rents 3.1
percent). Thus their model suggests Stage Two tax increases on
housing will be partially shifted backward onto land. This is
consistent with the property tax literature which suggests that a
national change in property taxation will be borne by capital and
land.
C. Partial Equilibrium Models
The final sort of model to analyse Stage Two is a partial
equilibrium model of the housing market which has the great
advantage of presenting a detailed representation of the housing
market (although missing the dynamic and general equilibrium
effects). Also, partial equilibrium models are better for analysing
short run changes in specific markets and these short run changes
1988]
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are important in the politics of tax reform. Fallis and Smith14
analysed the effects of Stages One and Two combined on the
housing sector and the results in this paper are derived from that
article. Fallis and Smith used a stock adjustment model, the flavour
of which can be briefly conveyed. In the model it is assumed that
the demand for and supply of services from the existing stock
determine the price of housing services. In rental markets, this is
the market rental price; in ownership markets it is the implicit rental
price of ownership stock (or user cost). (In rent controlled markets
- and all but three provinces in Canada have rent controls - the
rent is set by government regulation rather than by market forces.15)
Households move between ownership and uncontrolled rental
markets to equate the price of services in each. The price of
housing stock is then established as the present value of future net
rents, discounting these at the appropriate rate. The level (flow) of
new construction is set by comparing the price of existing stock with
the cost of constructing new stock. Housing market adjustment is
set by the inelasticity of the supply of housing services in the short
run and by the relatively small change which new construction and
renovation can make to total stock in the medium run. Housing
markets take a long time to move to a new long-run equilibrium.
In the partial equilibrium model, demand increases
immediately push up rents and so raise the price of stock. The
stock of housing is not immediately increased but over time new
construction and renovation increase in response to the higher
capital values, until a new equilibrium is reached. Changes affecting
investors in rental housing do not alter rents at first; but alter
capital values, hence construction and then over time rents.
Increases in construction costs do not immediately affect rents or
14Supra, note 3.
15 In some provinces new construction is exempt creating a more complicated case of two
rental markets, one controlled and one uncontrolled.
[voL 26 No. 3
Stage Two Tax Refonn and Housing
capital values, but depress construction levels and therefore
eventually raise rents and the price of stock.16
1. Uncontrolled rental markets
Fallis and Smith begin by analysing an uncontrolled rental
market. Stage Two will likely cause little change in the total
demand for rental housing services or in the choice of ownership
versus rental housing and so the market rent will be unchanged. In
this model, there is no forward shifting of MSST-induced operating
cost increases into rent in the short run because the demand for
housing services is unchanged and the supply is almost perfectly
inelastic.
Operators of existing rental buildings will face price increases
on certain operating inputs because of the substitution of the MSST
for the MST. Fallis and Smith set out the "typical situation" of an
existing rental building held for a 10-year period. A building worth
1,000,000 has an 80 percent mortgage at 10%; operating costs are
about 50 percent of gross rent and grow at 5 percent per year; gross
rents are 17.5 percent of capital value and grow at 4.25 percent per
year. The after-tax internal rate of return on the investment varies
significantly according to whether the investor can offset losses
against other real estate income and whether the proceeds on sale
are treated as capital gains or business income. It was assumed that
Stage Two increased half of operating costs by 8 percent. If the
investor cannot offset losses, the increased operating costs reduce
after-tax cash flows by the same amount and postpone the time until
the project must pay income tax. The present value of the cash
flow valued at the original internal rate of return declines from
$200,000 to about $177,500, assuming rents do not change from
their pre-reform path. This does not mean capital values fall 11.3
percent (22.5/200) because as capital values fall the mortgage
needed falls, interest payments decrease and after-tax cash flows
16This assumes static expectations, i.e., investors expect current rents will persist. More
realistically, investors will have rational expectations and will recognize that current
construction declines will raise future units. These expected increases will raise current asset
prices.
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increase. Capital values would have to fall about 6 percent to
restore the internal rate of return.
This 6 percent decline overstates the asset price decline
because it assumes no change in rents; but future rents will change.
Assume that Stage Two has no affect on any aspect of the housing
market except that it increases the cost of operating rental housing
units. Asset prices would fall, new construction and renovation
would fall, and rents would rise faster than they otherwise would
have. These future rent changes would be anticipated by investors
and therefore the short run fall in asset prices would be less than 6
percent. To illustrate, if period one gross rent had risen 2.2 percent
and then grown at the rate assumed before reform, then the price
of an investment building would not decline in the short run.
In dividing the market's adjustment between a rent increase
and an asset price decline, the crucial issue is the speed at which
rents move to their new long-run equilibrium. If the price elasticity
of demand is 1.0, a 2 percent increase in equilibrium rent requires
a 2 percent decline in equilibrium stock. The issue therefore is by
how much new construction will contract to bring about this decline
in stock. In markets where demand is weak and construction levels
are already low, adjustment will take a long time - asset prices will
fall significantly in the short run. In markets where demand is
growing and construction at a high level (but still in the price elastic
region of the construction supply curve) adjustment will be quick
(construction falls significantly) and asset prices do not fall as much
in the short run. But in the markets where demand is growing and
new construction is not sensitive to price, adjustment will be slow.
Thus far, the effect of Stage Two on the building and land
development industry has not been considered. All the changes
analysed above arose solely because the costs of operating a building
rose. However, for developers and builders, Stage Two has
significant implications. The MST on building materials is removed
but their sales will be subject to MSST. The results of this are now
considered; ignoring the effects of the change in operating costs.
Assuming that the MST was forward shifted so its removal and
replacement by the MSST leaves building materials prices
unchanged, and that building materials are 40 percent of the cost of
a rental building, and that some other costs will have reflected the
MST, then Stage Two moves the new construction/renovation supply
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curve up by about 4.5 percent. At any asset price paid by investors,
the builder will receive less and so be willing to supply less. This
stock adjustment model assumes that the demand for new projects
is perfectly elastic in each period at a price determined by the
present value of expected future net rents.
If the construction supply curve is elastic, new construction
will contract significantly. Expected future rents will rise, raising
asset prices which in turn mitigates the decline in new construction.
The housing market moves to its new long-run equilibrium quite
quickly. If the new construction supply curve is quite inelastic, new
construction will fall little, asset prices will change little, the Stage
Two changes will be passed backward to owners of land and to
owners of development and building firms.
Now consider the full effects of Stage Two in an
uncontrolled rental market, including provisions affecting both the
costs of operating buildings and provisions affecting the
development/building industry. Current period rents will be
unchanged. Operating cost increases will at first push down asset
values and reduce construction levels which will then increase
expected future rents. The VAT on new building sales will reduce
construction, which raises expected future rents and so asset values.
The new long-run equilibrium will have a higher price of housing
services, a higher price of housing assets and a lower stock of rental
housing. Part of the change will be passed forward in the price of
rental housing services and part will be passed back onto land. The
path to the new long-run equilibrium is difficult to predict. It
depends most importantly on the degree to which new construction
responds. If construction contracts significantly, future rents rise
more quickly and current asset prices may even rise slightly. On the
other hand if construction contracts slowly, future rents rise slowly
and current asset prices likely fall. Given the low levels of private
rental construction, the most likely result is slow adjustment.
The final equilibrium position is sensitive to the share of
building materials in the total cost of a new building! 7 The higher
the share the less Stage Two will affect construction. There are
1 7 The numerical calculations are of course also sensitive to the whole range of
assumptions made, especially about the typical investor and the typical apartment project.
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significant variations in the share across local housing markets
because of variations in the cost of land. Cities with high land costs
have lower shares of building materials in total cost and so will be
more affected by Stage Two. Such cities may be at the top of a
building boom and also have an inelastic supply curve. Construction
and rents may then adjust slowly and therefore the burden of Stage
Two will be shifted in the short run to land and factors inelastically
supplied to construction and land development.
2. Rent controlled markets
Of course all of the above assumed that rents were market
determined. If there are binding rent controls, as there are in most
provinces, the results are considerably different. Rents are set by
government regulation not markets. Most rent control regimes do
have provisions for passing operating cost increases into rents but
only with a considerable lag. In rent controlled markets, asset prices
would fall, and such new construction and renovation that is
occurring would decline. This reduced construction does not set in
motion an ameliorating affect of raising expected future rents. Rent
controls just become more binding. Even more critical, the VAT on
new buildings may not be able to be passed forward (via reduced
construction and then higher future rents). The VAT on new
buildings will be passed back onto land and other factors, construc-
tion will fall and the excess demand in rental markets will increase.
Some control regimes do allow forward shifting via the regulations
which set the first rent on new buildings.
This all points to a significant potential problem for Stage
Two in rent controlled markets. If Stage Two costs cannot be
passed forward under the regulations governing existing rents and
under the regulations governing the setting of rents on new
buildings, then maintenance, construction and renovation will
decline. Rent controls will become more binding and excess demand
will increase. All provinces should examine their regulations to
ensure costs can be passed forward.
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3. Ownership markets
In principle, the market for homeownership functions as an
uncontrolled rental market and the extensive discussion of the
uncontrolled rental market could be applied and deemed to describe
the effects of Stage Two on ownership housing. Like rental
markets, increases in the costs of operating a home will tend to
reduce property prices although this will be ameliorated somewhat
as reduced construction levels raise expected future prices and so
increase expected capital gains. (Increases in operating costs are
immediately felt by owners because owners are both landlord and
tenant; in rental markets landlords feel the costs first and gradually
they are passed to tenants.) Also, increases in construction costs
will tend first to reduce construction levels and then over time
increase house prices. (Again, it should be noted that this analysis
assumes Stage Two has no effect on mortgage interest rates. The
MSST on financial services may increase mortgage interest rates
which would further reduce new construction.)
However, there are important differences between the rental
and ownership markets in Canada. The rental model used above
made two basic assumptions: new construction was a tiny fraction
of existing stock and new stock and old stock were perfect
substitutes for one another. Together this meant in any one period
the demand for new housing construction was perfectly elastic at a
price established as the present value of future net rents (and rents
are set in the existing housing market). These two basic
assumptions are relatively realistic for Canadian uncontrolled rental
markets but much less realistic for ownership markets.
In ownership markets, annual new construction is a greater
proportion of the existing stock. Furthermore, demand is growing.
This means adjustment will likely be faster in ownership markets.
Construction will contract more quickly and asset prices will rise
more rapidly on both new and existing housing. There may even be
slight immediate capital gains on existing houses.
However, the latter conclusion changes depending on how
separate are the new and existing housing markets. If new and old
houses are perfect substitutes, the two markets may be analysed as
one and there will be only a slight immediate increase in asset
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prices. However new and old houses are not perfect substitutes;
they differ in design, finishings and often location and lot size. It is
likely that a significant number of households prefer new to old
housing. Assuming that the marginal new home buyer has a
preference for new housing, the price of new and old housing can
diverge for some time. It is likely in the short run that the VAT on
new homes will push up the price of new homes without an
proportionate increase in the price of existing houses. But the
closer is an existing home to being a substitute for new homes, the
more likely that the existing home will immediately appreciate in
value. Thus owners of newer, existing homes are more likely to
enjoy an immediate capital gain.
IV. CONCLUDING EVALUATION
The Minister of Finance in announcing tax reform18 declared
that the reform proposals had been designed to meet five broad
objectives:
(1) Fairness: the fairness of the tax system should be
increased;
(2) Competitiveness: the tax system should encourage
competitiveness, growth and jobs;
(3) Simplicity: the tax system should be simpler to under-
stand and comply with;
(4) Consistency: the tax system should be internally
consistent and consistent with other government programmes;
and
(5) Reliability: the tax system should provide a more reliable
and balanced source of revenues to finance essential public
services.
18Supra, note 1.
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It makes little sense to judge the housing provisions of Stage
Two in isolation against these five objectives; rather, the entire
reform package must be considered. The fundamental question is
whether a shift from income to consumption taxes is desirable. An
answer is much beyond the scope of this paper; only a much
narrower sort of evaluation is possible.
There are basically three ways to treat housing under a VAT.
The consumption of housing services can be included in the base;
and therefore suppliers of housing services (both landlords and
homeowners) would be subject to VAT on their sales. Taxes
embodied in input prices could be subtracted. Sales of both new
and old housing would be taxable; but subtracted by the purchaser.
The administrative and political problems of including homeowners
makes this option untenable in Canada.
The second option is to exempt imputed rents and residential
rents, exempt sales of used residential buildings but tax sales of new
buildings. This is the option chosen by Canada. Sales of used
buildings cannot be taxed because there would be cascading of this
turnover tax. New and old housing stock are treated differently
under this option and some analysts have predicted significant capital
gains to owners of existing stock. This prediction fails to recognize
the nature of the adjustment process in housing markets. As argued
above, capital values will more likely rise slowly to a new long-run
equilibrium. This second option taxes all but the last stage in the
process of producing housing services from new stock. Services
from old stock are taxed at a lower rate but over time all but the
last stage of the process enters the base.
The third option is to exempt imputed and paid rent, exempt
sales of used buildings and zero rate (exemption plus subtraction) all
housing development and construction. Under this option, housing
consumption bears no tax except insofar as operating input costs are
increased by the VAT.
Housing is a necessity and the ratio of housing expenditure
to income falls with income; and so the VAT on housing
consumption is regressive. But the bulk of the tax savings from an
exemption (such as under option three) flow to higher income
households and overall VAT rates will have to be higher with an
exemption. A full exemption increases administrative complexity,
compliance costs and reduces economic efficiency. And housing
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already has tax preferences under the income tax. Other taxes and
transfers should be used to offset any undesirable distributional
consequences from taxing housing consumption and this has been
done to a degree under Stage Two. A survey of the European
experience with the VAT 9 concluded that the disadvantages of
multiple rates and exemptions outweighed any gains from reduced
regressivity. Distributional objectives should be sought with other
instruments, especially income taxes and transfers.
Thus the Stage Two proposals represent the best approach
to dealing with housing consumption under a VAT. There are
several aspects of Stage Two, however, which require further
attention.
The first is to ensure that Stage Two and rent regulation do
not interact to significantly reduce the rental housing stock.
Another aspect is that short term rentals such as hotels and
motels are subject to tax, which is reasonable because these are not
the permanent residences of the occupants. However, many of the
poorest people in Canada do not have a permanent residence and
live in hostels, hotels, and rooming houses on short-term rentals. A
means should be found to exempt these rentals in order that we do
not inadvertently apply a higher tax rate on the housing consump-
tion of those least able to afford it.
And finally, the VAT will increase the cost of operating
housing assistance programs particularly those programs which supply
new housing stock. Presumably, the intent of Stage Two is not to
reduce the real value of Canada's commitment to housing assistance.
A compensating adjustment in our nominal commitment would be in
order at the federal, provincial and municipal levels.
Stage Two will have many other effects on the housing
sector, most of which cannot be dealt with here. For example the
services supplied by realtors will be subject to the MSST. Also
many sections of the MSST rules not expressly dealing with housing
will nevertheless influence the sector, such as the rules governing
financial services, small businesses and co-operatives. However, two
effects do warrant comment in this concluding evaluation.
1 9 Henry J. Aaron, The Value-Added Tax. Lessons from Europe (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institute, 1981) at 9.
[VOL. 26 NO. 3
Stage Two Tax Reform and Housing
Stage Two exempts the value added in the last stage of
producing housing services and therefore agents in the economy will
have an incentive to bring as much as possible of the process of
producing housing services into this exempt stage. For example,
landlords will have an incentive to employ their own
superintendents, and maintenance and repair workers rather than
purchase services from outside firms. Large landlords owning many
buildings will be able to employ their own plumbers, painters,
cleaners and so on. Very small landlords may already do these
things themselves. Medium-sized landlords however may not be able
to move activity into the exempt stage; they may not be large
enough to employ a full-time carpenter or plumber or whatever and
so may still have to use other firms or individual contractors.
Landlords will have an incentive to be their own general contractor
for major renovations. Homeowners, as small landlords, will have
the same sort of incentives and will find it more advantageous to do
their own repairs or gardening or to be the general contractor on a
renovation project. These tax-induced reorganizations are
inefficient, but cannot be stopped because there is no feasible means
of taxing all of the process of producing housing services.
The MSST is intended to tax the value added at each stage
in the production of final consumption. It is a tax on labour usage 2°
at each stage in the production process. Land developers argue that
land appreciates in value as they move it from rural to urban use,
in part because of value added by their labour but in part because
of capital gains. Therefore they pay tax not only on their value
added but also on their investment gains. As is evident from the
proposals dealing with financial services, Stage Two does not seek
to tax investment gains. Some of the capital gains of developers are
externalities from the public provision of roads, sewers and other
infrastructure and to tax them may improve economic efficiency.
Some of the gains reflect an increase in the long run price of
housing services and it is probably appropriate to tax these gains just
as it is appropriate to tax inventory gains of manufacturers. There
seems no feasible way to exempt short-run investment gains; but
20 In a two-factor closed economy, a comprehensive VAT is equivalent to a payroll tax
Carl S. Shoup, Public Finance (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969) at 255.
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consideration might be given to allowing MSST deduction in the
computation of capital gains tax.
In conclusion, the approach of Stage Two in dealing with
housing is sensible, although the government now faces a political
problem. Stage One offered tax advantages to many (although not
all) in the housing sector; but Stage Two increases the tax rate on
housing consumption. This increase will be quite significant if a
federal-provincial MSST is adopted because housing is also exempt
from the provincial sales tax. The pressure to exempt housing
somehow will be intense; just as intense pressure is building from all
sectors presently exempt from the MST and provincial sales tax.
